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Sustainable development (SD) is premised on the inescapable
and integral role played by humans in shaping and impacting the
natural world and has been recognized as a foundational norm of
international environmental law and policy. Ecologicalism- an
outlook that embraces a comprehensive approach to
interdependent natural and human systems- provides the
conceptual underpinnings for a creative and integrated
environmental management philosophy for implementing SD. This
Article argues that the daunting task of defining and applying
such an integrated approach and philosophy to the multiple
interacting changes affecting planetary life support systems can
benefit from the U.S. experience in addressing the need for
integrated pollution control (IPC). It also contends that the
relatively new discipline of Industrial Ecology (IE) that pairs
industry with ecology offers a promising new system paradigm for
analyzing human activity within the biophysical environment. By
entwining humans and their needs with ecosystems, IE does in
fact aspire to become the "science of sustainability."
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INTRODUCTION
Our global and local life support systems consist of the
major physical, chemical, biological, political, legal, and
institutional systems of the world, as well as the knowledge base
of humankind.' The interrelated nature of these complex life
support systems demands an integrated approach to their
management. Approaching management in an integrated manner
is a means of, or a method for, achieving environmental and
human goals. Goals to be achieved through management
objectives should be formulated with the concept of sustainable
development as their foundation.
As defined in this Article, sustainable development (SD) calls
for using natural resources in a manner fulfilling human needs
while also ensuring that resources continue to be available for
use by future generations. SD is a political construct that has
been accepted as a foundational norm of environmental law and
policy by the international community. In addition, the
international community has accepted SD as the grundnorm
1. As defined in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS,
A life support system is any natural or human-engineered system that
furthers the life of the biosphere in a sustainable fashion. The fundamental
attribute of life support systems is that together they provide all of the
sustainable needs required for continuance of life. These needs go far
beyond biological requirements. Thus life support systems encompass
natural environmental systems as well as ancillary social systems required
to foster societal harmony, safety, nutrition, medical care, economic
standards, and the development of new technology. The one common thread
in all of these systems is that they operate in partnership with the
conservation of global natural resources.
Conceptual Framework, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS (Feb. 10, 2000), at
http://www.eolss.co.uk [hereinafter EOLSS].
2. A grundnorm, translated in the United States as the basic norm, is the
foundational premise or initial hypothesis conferring validity or legitimacy on all
other norms of international environmental governance. As formulated by the
Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen, "[It is the postulated ultimate rule according to which
norms... are established and annulled, receive or lose their validity." HANS KELSEN,




(basic norm) of international environmental law ever since it was
proclaimed to be such at the Earth Summit of 1992. Despite its
exalted status, the concept of SD maintains a chimerical
character; it needs to be honed, refined, and more clearly
defined. While the concept of SD continues to evolve, a recent re-
statement of SD conceptualized by a group including a
significant number of Nobel Laureates is worthy of particular
attention.4
This distinguished group defines SD as the wise use of
resources through social, economic, technological, and ecological
policies governing natural and human engineered capital.5
According to this restatement, such policies should promote
innovations that assure a higher degree of life support for the
fulfillment of human needs while ensuring intergenerational
equity.
Defining SD this way creates a significant change in the
national and international approaches to environmental
protection. For instance, during the 1960s and 1970s,
environmental activists were mainly concerned with preserving
endangered species and safeguarding natural resources from
human depredation. Humans were generally cast in the role of
predators, parasites, and wrongdoers. SD, on the other hand,
embraces human welfare as a central objective, while
simultaneously pursuing conservation,6 or ecologicalism (a world
view based on the principles of ecology).
This definition of SD recognizes human interaction with the
natural world. Such interaction is consistent with the non-
equilibrium paradigm in ecology. The non-equilibrium paradigm
may be contrasted with the equilibrium model that calls for
3. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
or Earth Summit was convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. The Earth Summit
was the biggest and most important environmental conference in history. It sought to
give expression to sustainable development and fulfill its goals of addressing the dual
problems of environmental protection and socio-economic development by producing
two treaties: the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention
on Climate Change; two instruments: the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21; together
with a non-binding declaration on Forest Principles.
4. Inspired in part by UNCED and subsequent conferences and events, a
collection of noted scientists, scholars, and policymakers determined to create a
comprehensive and authoritative body of knowledge incorporating a unified,
interdisciplinary understanding of the interdependence of natural and human-
created systems. To this end, these visionaries initiated the ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE
SUPPORT SYSTEMS (EOLSS), a project currently under development. EOLSS, supra
note 1.
5. SeeEOLSS, supranote 1.
6. Sir Shridath Ramphal, Sustainable Development, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 680 (Ruth A. Eblen & William R. Eblen eds., 1994).
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preservation of the natural world through the exclusion, or
limited intervention, of humans. Thus, the non-equilibrium
model integrates humans into the natural world and allows for
appropriate human intervention into natural systems in an effort
to maximize life support systems.
7
We now know that ecological systems do not possess fixed
equilibria, or static stability, but are instead characterized by
change.8 Such a view sees nature in a constant state of flux, and
stands in marked contrast to the earlier belief that ecological
systems exist in a perfectly balanced, or stable, state. Not
surprisingly, a significant number of environmental lawyers and
policymakers have been weaned on the view, prevailing in the
1960s and 1970s, that law and policy should strive to restore,
and not tamper with, the primordial balance of nature. Thus,
much bedrock legislation such as the Endangered Species Act,9
the Wilderness Act, 10 the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA)," Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 2 and the
broader non-degradation provisions of the Clean Air 3 and Clean
Water Acts 14 are based on the premise that nature is best
protected when it is left untouched. According to the equilibrium
view, the absence of human intervention attempting to restore
nature to a previous state free of human intrusion would enable
nature to achieve a natural permanence of form and structure
that would persist indefinitely."5
In contrast to the equilibrium view, the non-equilibrium
paradigm recognizes that living things and the external world are
not separate static entities, but are interacting components of
complex, dynamic systems. Today's ecologists point out that
humans and their environments are interacting components of
these systems and that practically all inhabited environments
7. See Ruth A. Eblen & William R. Eblen, Preface, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at xv.
8. Daniel B. Botkin, Ecological Stability, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 6, at 164, 166 (1994).
9. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
10. National Wilderness Preservation System, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994).
11. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994)
(-NEPA").
12. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
13. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
14. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
15. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1121 (1994); see also Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995).
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have been profoundly altered by human cultures." Human life
necessarily implies interventions into nature; however, if
managed according to the knowledge available, these
interventions can be ecologically sound, and can create new
environmental values. 7 An important element of this viewpoint is
that it is not always true that "nature knows best" because
nature often creates ecosystems that are inefficient, wasteful,
and destructive. Thus, the non-equilibrium perspective proposes
that by using reason, knowledge, imagination, and toil, people
can shape ecosystems that have more efficient qualities that
nature could not achieve.1 8
Traditionally, life support systems have been managed in a
fragmented manner. These systems can be better managed if
they are viewed as an integrated whole. Professor Pamela Matson
offers illuminating examples of multiple interacting changes,
affecting water, atmosphere, and biodiversity, among life support
systems.1 9 These examples provide evidence in support of the
view that calls for an integrated management approach that
embraces not only natural life support systems (physical,
chemical, and biological) but also human systems (legal and
institutional).
Many experts call for life support systems to be managed
through an integrated approach. Ecologists are steadfast in
suggesting the need for a comprehensive, as distinct from a
fragmented, approach to environmental problems. Moreover, by
adopting an ecological perspective, scientists offer a better view
of the enormous biocomplexity confronting an integrated
approach to environmental decisionmaking.
Physical, chemical, and biological scientists, in a remarkable
display of interdisciplinary cooperation, confront the interrelated
character, or biocomplexity, of global problems by successfully
establishing huge billion-dollar initiatives on global change, such
as the International Geosphere Biosphere Program (IGBP) and
the World Climate Research Program (WCRP). These institutions
intend to produce a comprehensive and integrated model of the
physical, chemical, and biological processes that regulate the
16. Ruth A. Eblen & William R. Eblen, supra note 7, at xv.
17. Id. atxv-xvi.
18. Rene Dubos. Humanized Environments. in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 344.
19. See Pamela Matson, Environmental Challenges for the Twenty-First Century,
Interacting Challenges and Integrative Solutions, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1179 (2001).
11952001]
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world.2 0 These studies will consider the biosphere, the geosphere,
and all the interactions within and between them. For example,
studies include "biogeochemistry" where models track the cycles
of chemical elements that flow through ecosystems,
"biogeophysics" where models determine the way energy flows
through ecosystems, and additional models that predict the
effects of land use on ecosystems. The collection of data for
undertaking such an effort has already begun.
2 1
Unfortunately, many exalted interdisciplinary ventures,
including the National Science Foundation's (NSF's) new
biocomplexity initiative,22 while netting huge dollars from
Congress, appear to be confined to physical, natural, and
chemical scientists, to the substantial exclusion of social
scientists and lawyers. As Professor Kai Lee argues, these hard
sciences need to be integrated, not separated, from policy and
law at the "design" stage.2 3 The failure to do this will almost
certainly result in the non-implementation of the laudable
comprehensive approach being taken and will constitute an
inefficient use of public money. The present article is important
because it demonstrates that the most effective way to change
existing law, policy, and institutions is for law and policymakers
to work in tandem with scientists in an ex ante, instead of the
traditional ex post fashion.
Because an integrated approach is a way to achieve both
environmental and human goals, its methods of management
should be crafted and molded in light of these substantive goals.
The exercise of formulating specific substantive goals is an
ongoing and dynamic process, informed by the knowledge base
emerging out of grass roots, national, regional, and global efforts.
However, these goals must be built on the foundations of
sustainable development.
While recognizing that environmental objectives are an
integral part of this discussion, this Article does not attempt the
daunting conceptual exercise of redefining the objective of
environmental protection in light of SD. Rather, this Article
20. PROTECTION OF GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CONVERGING STRATEGIES 8-9 (Lakshman
Guruswamy & Jeffrey McNeey eds., 1998).
21. A Problem as Big as a Planet, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 1994, at 83.
22. "Biocomplexity is a multi-disciplinary approach to understanding the world's
environment... [it accounts for] the importance of scale, from micro to macro, and
includes social and behavioral sciences into the ecosystem calculus." Jeffrey Mervis,
Biocomplexity Blooms in the NSF's Research Garden, 286 SCI. 2068 (1999) (quoting
Rita Colwell, Director, National Science Foundation).




focuses on integration as a method of achieving the objectives of
SD and argues that attempts to understand and integrate life
support systems at a global level should be informed by, and
incorporated into past and ongoing integrative experiments, at a
more functional, place-based or local level.
This Article identifies two aspects of ecologicalism- a world
view based on the principles of ecology. The first aspect of
ecologicalism, anchored in the objectives of SD, establishes a
new paradigm about the nature of ecological systems that may
call for a review of existing legal objectives. The second aspect of
ecologicalism, based on local, regional, and global
interdependency of life support systems, posits the need for
developing integrated management strategies for managing life
support systems in a manner that maintains their sustainability.
We are currently witnessing a historic confluence of politics and
science. SD and the non-equilibrium paradigm are creating
conceptions of resource use that were once shunned by
equilibrium ecologists, lawmakers, and policymakers. The
convergence of SD and the non-equilibrium paradigm heightens
the need for a reevaluation and redefinition of the objectives,
substantive goals, and rationales underlying environmental
protection in the United States, as well as in the international
arena.
This Article is organized into four parts. Part I of this Article
outlines the nature and importance of sustainable development
and then delineates how it reconfigures the objectives of
environmental protection. Part II examines how ecologicalism
offers a scientific rationale for the political construct of
sustainable development. Part III then discusses integration as a
method of achieving environmental objectives. The daunting task
of defming and applying an integrated approach to the multiple
interacting changes affecting the entirety of planetary life
support systems can benefit from the U.S. experience in
controlling pollution. Based on a case study of the United States,
this part explains why integrated policymaking is a dynamic,
evolving process in which partial, albeit unfolding knowledge,
permits only incremental progress. Part III concludes by
suggesting that it is almost impossible to conceive, let alone
institutionalize and implement, a grand design for planetary
integration that embraces all of Earth's life support systems.
Finally, Part IV argues the case for implementing integrated
strategies at a functional, place-based level. In Part IV, the
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Article suggests that despite the baffling degrees of
"biocomplexity"24 encountered by such an approach, the
scientific, economic, and socio-political arguments for an
integrated approach to pollution control must now include global
life support systems. The emerging field of industrial ecology (IE)
complements our comprehension of the biocomplexity
surrounding the global life support systems of the planet.
IE offers a promising whole-system paradigm for analyzing
human activity within the biophysical environment by pairing
industry with ecology. It does so by drawing together the natural
world as a whole system based on principles of ecology, and the
full cycle of human modifications of the environment, through
the market-based and regulatory institutions that govern
industry. IE examines how local, regional, and global materials
and energy flows in products and processes affect and are
affected by a gamut of human activities in industrial societies
and economies. By entwining humans and their needs with
ecosystems, it does in fact aspire to become the "science of
sustainablity."25 For the purposes of this discussion, IE and
integration are mutually reinforcing endeavors that share a
common view of the natural world as a system, and attempt to
understand materials and energy flows. 2 6 The concepts of mass
flow analysis27 and life cycle analysis are common to both
endeavors.
Specifically, this section argues that an integrated approach,
based on scientific constructs of the kind suggested by Professor
Matson,28 must be incorporated and implemented within the
political parameters of SD. This symposium has recognized that
one of the most daunting challenges facing the new century is to
formulate laws, policies, and institutions that address SD. This
paper offers some modest suggestions as to how we might begin
to meet these challenges when dealing with environmental
integration.
These unfolding findings should then form the basis of
managerial or policy decisions that could be applied on an
incremental basis to advance integrated approaches at a local
24. Id.
25. T. E. GRADEL & B. R. ALLENBY, INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY (1995).
26. Charles W. Powers & Marion R. Chertow, Industrial Ecology, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY 24-26 (1997).
27. Robert Ayers et al., Human Impacts on the Carbon and Nitrogen Cycles, in
INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY AND GLOBAL CHANGE 121-155 (Robert H. Socolow et al. eds.,
1994).
28. See Matson, supra note 19.
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pollution control level, as well as climate change at a global level.
Doing so will, of course, necessitate the creation of law and
policy frameworks that can respond to new knowledge in a
dynamic as distinct from a static manner.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
In 1983, the General Assembly of the United Nations (U.N.)
created the World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED or Brundtland Commission) and charged
the WCED with proposing long-term environmental strategies for
SD. The U.N. did not define that elusive term, and despite the
efforts of the Brundtland Commission and the Earth Summit,
the term SD still eludes satisfactory definition. After four years of
deliberation, worldwide consultation and study, the Brundtland
Report, Our Common Future,29 articulated the paradigm on which
the Earth Summit, and indeed International Environmental Law
(IEL) has since been based. In essence, it rejected the pessimistic
thesis that environmental problems were beyond repair, spiraling
out of control, and could only be averted by no growth (arresting
development and economic growth). Instead, the Brundtland
report argued that economic growth was both desirable and
possible within a context of SD.30
Although SD was not clearly defined by the Brundtland
Commission, some of its key attributes are identifiable. First, SD
calls for developmental policies and for economic growth that
work to relieve the great poverty of Less Developed Countries
(LDCs) while protecting the environment. Second, SD suggests
that development and growth should be based on policies that
sustain and expand the environmental resource base in a
manner that meets the needs of the present generation without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs. Consequently, SD was envisioned as environmentally
sensitive development.: By rejecting economic development that
destroys the resource base, along with environmentally
insensitive growth, SD, as originally conceived, confers parity of
status to economic growth and environmental protection.
The iteration of SD that emerged at the Earth Summit was
somewhat different from that suggested by the Brundtland
29. WORLD COMM'N ON ENVrL. DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
30. See i at xil.
31. Id. at 1-8.
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Commission. 2 To begin, the intended "Earth Charter" was
replaced by the "Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development" (Rio Declaration),33 a title that diminished the
environmental resonance and status of that document. Second,
the Rio Principles, in contrast to those of the Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment of 1972"4 (Stockholm
Declaration),35 stressed development at the expense of
conservation. For example, the nascent right to a wholesome
environment as embodied in the Stockholm Declaration was
abandoned in the Rio Declaration in favor of a right to
development (Principle 2).36 In addition, the obligation not to
cause trans-frontier damage contained in Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration 31 was weakened in Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration by the addition of crucial language authorizing
states "to exploit their own natural resources pursuant to their
own environmental and developmental policies."38
The Rio Declaration granted states the right to consume or
develop. This new right to develop replaced the previous
obligation, as found in the Stockholm Declaration, to conserve.
For instance, the Rio formulation refers to "developmental and
32. See supra note 4.
33. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992,
U.N.C.E.D. Doc. A/CONF.151/1 (Rev.1), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
34. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, June 16. 1972, Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human
Environment, Stockholm June 5-16, 1972. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 at 3
(1973), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 at 2-65, and Corr. 1 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972)
[hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
35. The Stockholm Convention on the Human Environment, 1972, was the first
international conference convened specifically to address global environmental
problems, and was the chrysalis from which international environmental law
emerged as a legal subject in its own right.
36. Rio Declaration, supra note 33, at Principle 2:
States have, In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
37. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 34, at Principle 21:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
38. Rio Declaration, supra note 33, at Principle 2 (emphasis added).
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environmental needs of present and future generations."" This
re-formulation necessarily negates or weakens the obligation to
conserve expressed in the Stockholm Declaration. Finally, the
Rio Declaration frowns upon unilateral actions, such as that
taken by the United States under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972,40 to prevent the killing of dolphins by prohibiting
imports of tuna caught in dolphin killing nets, or the protection
of endangered sea turtles.4' Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration,
stating that "[u]nilateral actions to deal with environmental
challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country
should be avoided,"4 2 effectively prevents a concerned state from
taking action to protect the international environment.
Not surprisingly, some commentators, including the present
author,4 3 argue that the Rio Declaration institutionalized a
preeminent right to economic development that enfeebled and
attenuated the imperative of SD.' The Convention on Biological
Diversity4 5 (CBD) confirms such a claim. While SD functions as a
prevailing force and ultimate objective of the CBD, the treaty
states both in its Preamble and in critical articles dealing with
the financing of the Convention that "economic and social
development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding
priorities of developing countries. "46 By diminishing
environmental protection, the Convention effectively tips the
balance of SD toward development rather than conservation.
Despite these misgivings about what it ought to mean, the hard
fact remains that SD is about development.4"
39. Id. at Principle 3 (stating that "[tihe right to development must be fulfilled so
as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations").
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1361-1421h (1994).
4 1. Lakshman Guruswamy, The Annihilation of Sea Turtles: WTO Intransigence
and U.S. Equivocation, 30 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,261 (2000).
42. Rio Declaration, supra note 33, at Principle 12.
43. Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Brent R. Hendricks, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 12-14 (1997).
44. See Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law in the Age of
Sustainable Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process, 15 J.L. & COM.
623, 630-35 (1996).
45. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
46. Id. at preamble T 19; see also id- art. 20, § 4.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6. While reference to sustainable
development is only made once in the CBD, it is repeatedly inscribed within two
common terms of the treaty: "conservation" and "sustainable use." These might be
seen as the twin poles of sustainable development. On the one hand, sustainable use
acknowledges the necessity of utilizing biological resources: "'Sustainable use'"
means the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does
not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its
2001]
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Consistent with its objectives, the EOLSS Conceptual
Framework defines SD as development that wisely uses human
and natural resources to assure a "higher degree of human
needs fulfillment, or life support."48 The life support systems
referred to are both natural and social systems that promote
human welfare. Thus, "life support systems" are defined as
"natural environmental systems as well as ancillary social
systems required to foster societal harmony, safety, nutrition,
medical care, economic standards, and the development of new
technology... that... operate in partnership with the
conservation of global natural resources. 49 These definitions give
primacy to the pursuit of human welfare and the betterment of
human quality of life through the prudential conservation of
natural resources. The emphasis is clearly on the advancement
of human welfare rather than on the protection of the
environment or the preservation of natural resources for its own
sake. In sum, it would be fair to conclude that the balance
struck in the EOLSS Conceptual Framework's definition of SD
favors development rather than conservation.
The manner in which SD is defined can have profound
implications for law, policy, and institutions. For example, the
existing paradigm of U.S. environmental laws and policies as
found in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), °
Endangered Species Act (ESA),5' the Preservation Act, 2 the Clean
Air Act (CAA),5 3 and Clean Water Act (CWA), 4 arguably
institutionalizes environmental protection as a value in its own
right, whether or not human needs are fulfilled or promoted.
Further, the laws embody a concept different from SD as
presently defined, a view based at least in part on a theory of the
environment and ecology that is not scientifically supported.
potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations."
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 45, art. II, 16. On the other hand,
conservation" is not defined in the treaty, but its usage clearly speaks to the
preservation of biological diversity. For example, the treaty does define in-situ
conservation as "the conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the
maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural
surroundings... ." Id., art. II, T 13. Thus, in combining the development connotation
of "sustainable use" with the preservation connotation of "conservation," the CBD
strikes the balance of sustainable development.
48. Conceptual Framework, supra note 1, at 7.
49. Id. at 1.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (1994).
51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
52. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).





Professor Matson's approach to water resources,
atmosphere, climate, biodiversity, and ecosystems may be
described as "ecologicalism."55 Such a perspective has been
distinguished from conservationism and environmentalism.
Conservationism centers around the wise use of resources and is
generally regarded in local terms. Environmentalism primarily
concerns human health and adopts a somewhat broader outlook.
Ecologicalism focuses on ecological sustainability and adopts a
comprehensive outlook that accounts for the local, regional, and
global interdependency of life support systems. For example, the
EOLSS enterprise symbolizes the global embrace of
ecologicalism. Two principles of ecologicalism are crucial to our
discussion. The first relates to equilibrium theory and the second
deals with the interconnected nature of ecological systems.
A. Equilibrium Theory
The prevalent view up to the 1960s and 1970s was that
ecological systems existed in perfect balanced stability. The
absence of human intervention was believed to restore the
balance of nature and enable it to achieve a natural permanence
of form that would persist indefinitely.5 6 Under this view, the
objective of law and policy was to restore, rather than interfere
with this balance of nature.
Policymakers found this scientific hypothesis, called the
equilibrium theory, attractive for reasons independent of the
scientific reasons for restoring a natural balance. It was
premised on a romantic view of nature that values ethical and
religious motivations as much or even greater than scientific
reasons. Aldo Leopold, for example, called for a new land
conservation ethic based on respect for the land.5 ' While he did
suggest scientific reasons for preserving land, based on the
ecologist Frederick Clements' theory of end-state equilibrium,'
Leopold's appeal for preservation rested primarily on ethical and
55. Riley E. Dunlap & Angela G. Mertig, Environmental Movement, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 211, 213.
56. See Joseph M. Petulla, Conservation Movement in the U.S., in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 114-15.
57. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE
201-26 (Oxford Univ. Press paperback ed. 1968).
58. See Frederick E. Clements, Nature and Structure of the Climax, 24 J. ECOLOGY
252. 255-56 (1936).
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moral grounds.59 Moreover, the "balance of nature" was a
concept rooted in Christian and Enlightenment world views.
60
According to some of these views, nature is made perfect by an
omniscient and omnipotent creator and is then wrongly defiled
by man. An affirmation that nature should be left to have its own
way thus becomes an expression of religious belief.6"
This convergence of science, ethics, and religion had a
profound influence on policymakers and scholars addressing
resource management.6 2 Equilibrium and the balance of nature
resonated strongly with policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s,
who were predominantly influenced by the first-world
environmentalism of the times.3 These views had not yet been
countervailed by the views of those from the third world. The
difference in these perspectives is encapsulated by the contrast
59. See Aldo Leopold, Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the Southwest, 1
ENvTL. ETrHICS 131 (1979).
60. DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRsT CENTURY (1990).
61. Influential contemporary commentators now attribute the balance of nature
views of earlier ecologists to the prescientific views of Greek and Roman philosophers,
who believed that nature, undisturbed by human action, achieves a permanence of
form and structure that persists indefinitely. According to the theory of ecological
succession, each ecosystem, having undergone a series of changes, ends in a
permanent climax that lasts indefinitely. Unfortunately, nature is destroyed by people
who are outside it and impact it adversely. Modem exponents of this view continue to
believe that nature forms a world apart from man, and that pristine places should be
unaltered and preserved. E.g. BILL MCKIBBON, THE END OF NATuRE 48, 55 (1989).
62. See Tarlock, supra note 15, at 1126-28. While Prof. Tarlock suggests that
Leopold was echoing the thesis of the ecologist Tansley about a "relatively stable
dynamic equilibrium" there is little doubt that Leopold was also clearly espousing
and pressing the need for a land ethic. Id. at 1127; see also BRYAN G. NORTON,
TOWARD UNITY AMONG ENVIRONMENTALISTS 39-60 (1991).
63. Environmentalism during this period was primarily the preoccupation of
first-world (American and European) elites and policymakers. The themes articulated
by RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962), BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE
(1971) and Kenneth Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN A GROWING ECONOMY 3 (1966) resonated from the United
States into the thinking of other industrial nations. Many of these themes were
melded and expressed with crusading cogency within an international context in
DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972). The computer modeled
Meadows study painted an apocalyptic picture of the growth of population, pollution,
and exhaustion of natural resources leading to a breakdown of the carrying capacity
of the Earth. The writing and ideology of global environmentalism captured the minds
of first world decisionmakers. It failed to have the same impact on the their third-
world counterparts, who felt that environmentalists did not comprehend why
development and growth were so crucial to the third world or less developed
countries. Third-world policy architects saw the eradication of pollution caused by
poverty, not environmental degradation, as their primary and overriding mission. To
third-world decisionmakers, development and economic growth, despite the
environmental damage they might cause, was the only way to eradicate the pollution
of poverty.
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between the tenor of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and Rio
Declaration of 1992. The first was clearly environmentalist and
the second developmental.
B. Non-Equilibrium Theory
The prevailing view today, however, is that the natural orders
of organisms, populations, biotic communities, ecosystems,
landscapes, biomes, biogeographic regions, and the biospherel
inevitably interact with the human order and undergo some kind
of change. This paradigm relies upon Darwinian evolutionary
theory to support the view that mutation and selection provide
mechanisms that allow for adaptations that progressively
become incorporated in the genetic apparatus of an evolving
organism or species. Therefore, populations, biotic communities,
and ecosystems can continue to exist only if they possess
mechanisms that enable them to maintain their identity despite
the endless pressure of external forces, and on the other hand to
respond adaptively to those forces.
6 5
Furthermore, contemporary ecological research
demonstrates that nature continually changes both in response
to internal processes, such as chemical cycling, and external
pressures, such as climate. Ecological systems are dynamic
64. These are the ecological levels of organization. See Eugene P. Odum, Ecology
as a Science, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 172.
65. See Rene Dubos, Environment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 6, at 210. The writings of Eugene Odum, one of the foremost and best-known
ecologists of our age, offers us a glimpse into the changes in ecological thinking.
Writing in 1959, he stated:
Homeostasis [keeping in equilibrium] at the organism level is a well known
concept in physiology .... We find that equilibrium between organisms and
environment may also be maintained by factors which resist change in the
system as a whole. Much has been written about this "balance of nature"
but only with the recent development of good methods for measuring rates
of function of whole systems has a beginning been made in the
understanding of the mechanisms involved.
Odum, supra note 64, at 172: EUGENE P. ODUM. FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 25 (2d.
ed. 1959).
By 1992, however, the first among his great overarching ideas for the 1990s
was that "lain ecosystem is a thermodynamically open, far from equilibrium, system."
Eugene P. Odum, Great Ideas in Ecology for the 1990s, 42 BIOSCIENCE 542, 542
(1992). These statements stand out in contrast to each other. Odum still believes that
humans "could be considered a parasite on the biosphere for life support ... "
Odum, supra note 64. at 174, but mention of an open, far from equilibrium system,
and the omission to mention the "balance of nature," is remarkable. Odum's 1992
conclusions apparently signal his recognition of a dramatic change in the views of
many mainstream ecologists.
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entities that are constantly changing.66 Whatever its complexity,
a biological system can continue to exist only if it can maintain
its identity despite these pressures.67
Others point out that we live in a state of "humanized
nature," in which the stewardship of the Earth goes beyond good
conservation practices:
It involves the creation of new ecosystems in which human
interventions have caused some changes in... land... and
living things to take advantage of ... nature that would
remain unexpressed in the state of wilderness. Throughout
history... humans have tampered with blind ecological
determinism.6
Moreover, the distinction between "nature" and "human" is
untenable from a Darwinian point of view because humans, like
other species, have evolved from other organisms. They are part
of the interconnected web of life.
69
A different metaphor explains how the science of
ecologicalism paired with the politics of SD becomes a "dance of
nature."7" Such a progression demands creative and integrative
ways of managing the environment in order to ensure that the
"dance of nature" does not become the dance of death.
The extent to which nature adapts or perishes will depend to
a great extent on how it is managed. The problems created by
changes with regional and global impacts encompass biophysical
phenomena arising from natural resource exploitation as well as
pollution. The United States has had ample opportunity to
confront and address the multiple interacting impacts of
environmental pollution.
Unfortunately, the U.S. experience concerning the
interconnected web of life demonstrates a dysfunctional
relationship between institutional implementation and scientific
theories. The United States has generally responded to water,
air, and land pollution by passing legislation dealing with the
immediately evident manifestations of pollution at the end of
pipelines, smoke stacks, or in waste dumps. As a result, law,
66. See Daniel B. Botkin, Ecological Stability, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6. at 164-66.
67. See Dubos, supra note 65, at 210.
68. Id. at 344.
69. See RODERICK F. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE 70 (1989); Weiner, supra note
15, at 349.
70. Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 875, 875-82 (1994) (explaining that the metaphor of the dance of nature
attempts to convey a sense of the dynamic, even tumultuous state of change and
adaptation in nature). See generally Wiener. supra note 15.
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policy, and administration generally do not reflect scientific




This section employs a United States case study to
demonstrate the need for integration. It first describes the facts
of the bio-physical and bio-chemical nature of pollution. The
section goes on to explain why fragmented, end-of-pipeline
effluent standards or end-of-stack emission controls address
local problems but do not address the causes of pollution. Such
regulations succeed only in cycling pollution from water to air to
land. Having examined the reasons as to why Congress chose to
adopt piecemeal strategies for controlling pollution, this section
proceeds to argue that the present system of policy, law, and
administration is both ineffectual and inefficient. The section
concludes by making the case for an integrated approach to
pollution control.
The experience of the United States in dealing with the need
to integrate pollution control is a harbinger of the greater
challenges confronting its application to global or planetary
issues. The last thirty years witnessed mounting criticism of the
failings of the existing fragmented approach to pollution control.
Commentators argue that the present fragmented regime
concentrates on moving the pollution generated by polluting
activities from one place to another.72 Unfortunately, such
pollution transfers ignore the basic law of physics: matter is
indestructible and does not go away.73 The initial destination of
pollutants may be altered, but ultimately they re-enter the flow
of material within the environment.
71. This section draws substantially, and reproduces sections from, Lakshman
Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtiays: Re-Opening of the Environmental Mind?. 1989
Wis. L. REV. 463 (1989).
72. This is because the laws aimed at reducing or removing pollutants from
specific mediums treat symptoms or effects that take the form of pollution rather
than the causes or sources that create the residuals or wastes in the first place. In
the result, pollution controls do not restrict the production per se of goods such as,
for example, cars, paper, or energy, that are the reason for the production processes
causing pollution, or even the processes themselves.
73. See Allen V. KNEESE & BLAIR T. BOWER, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND
RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT 1-12 (1979); Allen V. Kneese, Pollution and a Better
Environment, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 10 (1968); ALLEN V. KNEESE, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 16-73 (1977); MAYNARD M. HUFSCHMIDT ET AL., NATURAL SYSTEMS AND
DEVELOPMENT 73-113 (1983); LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND




Limiting discharges in one medium, such as air, while
correcting the immediate pollution problem within that medium,
often does little more than shift the pollution from air to land
without recognizing the adverse impact of transferred pollution.
Such transfers can create even greater problems in the medium
to which they are moved. Thus, control technologies aimed at
achieving specific limits to pollution generate new streams of
residuals that have adverse effects on other media. For example,
the provisions of the Clean Air Act directed at reducing sulfur
dioxide require the use of "scrubbers"74 in smoke stacks. Huge
quantities of lime, limestone solution, and water are sprayed on
exhaust gases as they flow up power plant smokestacks. Sulfur
dioxide in the gas reacts with the spray and forms a solution
from which sulfur dioxide is later removed, strained, and
disposed of in the form of sludge. 5 The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) estimates that three to six tons of scrubber sludge
may be produced for each ton of sulfur dioxide removed from the
flue gas.76 Consequently, the problem of sulfur dioxide in the air
is replaced by the problem of sludge disposal. Municipal
wastewater treatment and sewage treatment plants also produce
large quantities of sludge. Some of this sludge contains
nondegradable, bioaccumulable toxic substances.77 According to
one estimate, more than 118 million metric tons of sludge were
produced annually.78 While current technologies have reduced
scrubber residues, scrubbers continue to produce large masses
of sludge.7"
The effects of direct transfers are compounded by indirect
transfers resulting from physical, chemical, and biological
74. The Clean Air Act provided that new coal-fired electricity generators should
use "the best technological system of continuous emission reduction .... ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411 (1994). The EPA has determined that this necessitates the use of scrubbers.
75. Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New DeaL Coal and the
Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1481 n.56 (1980) (citing 2 EPA, FLUE GAS
DESULFURIZATION SYSTEM CAPABILITIES FOR COAL-FIRED STEAM GENERATORS 3-2 to 3-8
(1978) (EPA Pub. No. 600/7-8-032b)).
76. CONSERVATION FOUND., CONTROLLING CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS 8-9 (1984).
77. See id. at 9.
78. See id.
79. See BUSINESS HORIZONS, Mar. 1, 2000, at 9, available at 2000 WL 20177255.
A recent estimate by the U.S. Department of Energy relates to the coal burning power
plants used by electric utilities that are a major but not the only source of sludge
pollution. According to this estimate, electric utilities generate about 40 million tons
per year of toothpaste-like wet scrubber sludge. ENGINEERING NEWS RECORD, Sept. 20,
1999, available at 1999 WL 8232722. In 1992, one of the largest coal burning power
plants that met CAA requirements using scrubbers required a 383 acre reservoir,
covering 13 acres of wetland, and three large valleys inhabited by wildlife. Current
Developments, ENrvL. REP. (BNA), Apr. 3, 1992, available at 22 ER 2667.
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forces."0 Physical processes include leaching, volatilization, and
deposition. Leaching occurs when pollutants, particularly toxics,
are dissolved and percolate or move from waste disposal sites
into groundwater." Volatilization is the process of vaporization
that shifts pollutants from land or water to the air. 2 Deposition
is the transfer of pollutants from the air to land and water. Acid
rain is an illustration of the problems caused by depositions.
s3
For instance, in Chesapeake Bay where excessive nutrients,
including nitrogen, are a major problem, 25% of nitrogen
generated by human activity reaches the bay through the
atmosphere. The atmosphere also serves as a transfer medium
for volatilizing fertilizers and manure.'s In 1981, estimates
showed that air deposition accounted for 90% of polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) entering the Great Lakes." Furthermore, a
pollutant's chemical structure may change as it moves through
the environment.8 6 Biological processes in which microorganisms
break down toxic compounds also present new problems. 7
In addition, fragmented controls usually assess the risk of a
pollutant on the basis of a single chemical causing exposure in a
single medium. Regulations under the Clean Air Act, for
instance, typically consider the risk of exposure from a specific
source through the air. Regulations implementing the Federal
80. See BUSINESS HORIZONS, supra note 79, at 14-20.
81. See EDWARD A. KELLER, ENVIRONMENTAL GEOLOGY 54 (1976): CONSERVATION
FOUND., supra note 76, at 15-16.
82. See COMM. TO REVIEW METHODS FOR ECOTOxICOLOGY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
TESTING FOR EFFECTS OF CHEMICALS ON ECOSYSTEMS 16-18 (1981).
83. Acid rain, or more accurately acid deposition, results from the emissions into
the atmosphere primarily of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and to a lesser extent, of
hydrocarbons. Sulfur dioxide (SO.), which is largely produced by the burning of coal
containing sulfur in power generation and smelting processes, and combustion of
other fossil fuels by industrial, commercial, and residential users, gives rise to the
greatest concern, both as a gas and as a transformed product (sulfate). Nitrogen
oxides are emitted by the combustion of fossil fuels at high temperatures. The main
sources of man-made nitrogen oxides are motor vehicles and fossil fuel power plants.
See THE NAT'L ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (NAPAP), INTERIM ASSESSMENT:
THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF ACIDIC DEPOSITION, VOLUME 1: ExECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
(1987).
84. See ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, POLLUTED COASTAL WATERS: THE ROLE OF ACID RAIN
(1988).
85. See INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 22 (Nigel
Haigh & Frances Irwin eds., 1990).
86. For example, sulfur dioxide transforms into sulfate through several different
chemical processes, while sunlight acting on unburned hydrocarbons and nitrogen
oxides creates smog.
87. For example, microorganisms can change mercury into highly toxic methyl
mercury, while toxics could continue to accumulate in fish even though its
concentration in water has been reduced.
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Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)s8 evaluate the
risk to people who mix chemicals, spray chemicals, or eat food
containing chemical residues, but they do not usually consider
the risk to people who do all three. Human exposure to
pollutants can take place through three routes. A person may
inhale a substance, ingest it through water or food, or absorb it
through the skin. A study of cadmium exposure in Montana,
where inhalation exposure was the basis for limits on air
emissions, showed that there was more risk through food
(ingestion) than through inhalation. 9 Plants and animals are
subject to similar exposure. Absorption occurs when pollutants
settle on plants, or when marine animals are surrounded by
polluted water. Ingestion and inhalation occur when
contaminated prey or food is consumed or inhaled. Present
environmental laws ignore the multimedia risk posed by even a
single substance.
The present fragmented approach also lacks economic
efficiency. Pollution controls already in place ensure that wastes
cannot be discharged according to the best environmental
option. This may lead to inefficient use of the assimilative
capacity of the environment. In the example previously
considered, we observed how the implementation of the Clean Air
Act might lead to the creation of large quantities of sludge.
Sludge can be disposed of in a number of ways. It can be
discharged into a river or directly into the sea, or piped into a
lagoon to settle and dry out as solid waste. What is germane is
the possibility that current air pollution requirements might lead
to water discharges, or to solid waste disposal problems that
cause greater overall damage to the environment than might be
the case if the air pollution standards had been cognizant of
cross-media impacts. In addition, water pollution and land waste
disposal laws also could prevent sludge from being discharged
into water or disposed of as solid waste without first receiving
further treatment. Setting independent standards for each
medium that ignore the assimilative capacity of the environment
imposes unnecessary and unjustified costs, thereby making the
manufacturing process inefficient.
88. 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -1 3 6 y (1994).
89. See Elizabeth M. Rupp et al, Composite Hazard Index for Assessing Limiting
Exposures to Environmental Pollutants: Application Through a Case Study, 12 ENvrL.
Sci. & TECH. 806 (1978); CONSERVATION FOUND., supra note 76, at 22.
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A more efficient 9° and cost-effective method of pollution
control would be to distribute the wastes among the three media
of water, air, and land in a manner that makes optimum use of
the environment and of any special or particular assimilative
capacity it might possess. This policy would lead to a balanced
approach to pollution control that would help alleviate the
problems of standards that are overly stringent in some areas
and unduly lax in others.9
The Yorktown experiment92 illustrates the flaws of single
medium pollution control as well as the legal and administrative
problems attending attempts to move toward integrated pollution
control (IPC). This was the result of an EPA/Amoco Production
Company (Amoco) pilot study at Amoco's Yorktown, Virginia
refinery examining pollution prevention and alternative
permitting strategies. Among the more dramatic findings was the
fact that benzene emissions were controlled as part of the waste
stream of the refinery, but that the same carcinogenic chemical
was not controlled in dry docks that emitted far more benzene.
The bizarre result was that Amoco was spending $31 million to
rebuild its wastewater treatment facility to control benzene,
whereas far more benzene emission could be controlled by
spending $6 million in its drydocks. The results of the Yorktown
experiment also revealed that airborne hydrocarbon emissions
were being controlled at $2,400 per ton under existing
regulations, whereas more flexible regulations could enable the
same volume of hydrocarbons to be reduced for $500 per ton.
Unfortunately, existing regulations prevented EPA from
90. Apart from the inefficiency being discussed in the text, the present control
could be inefficient in other ways. The National Academy of Public Administration
has pointed out that statutory and administrative fragmentation has led to budgeting
rigidities, caused confusion, and generally impeded efficient administration. See NAT'L
ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., STEPS TOWARD A STABLE FUTURE 5 (1984).
91. E.g.. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 10-12
(1981); ALLEN V. KNEESE & CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES. AND PUBLIC
POLICY 81 (1975); James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro-
and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323, 324-30 (1974).
92. See Ronald E. Schmitt, The AMOCO/EPA Yorktown Experience and
Regulating the Right Thing, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 11 (1994): Pollution Prevention:
Pilot Project Cut Pollution at Less Cost than Mandated Rules, Amoco Official Says, 24
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 903, 903 (Sept. 24, 1993); EPA, Amoco Launch Pollution Prevention
Project, 14 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 70 (Apr. 20. 1990); Bradford C. Mank, What Comes
After Technology: Using an "Exception Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 263, 293 (1994) [hereinafter Mank,
Exception Process; AMOCO/EPA YORKTOWN POLLUTION PREVENTION PROJECT: PROJECT
SUMMARY (1992) [hereinafter AMOCO]; Bradford C. Mank. The Environmental Protection
Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative
Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 11-12 (1998) [hereinafter Mank, Project XL].
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exchanging the wastewater treatment facility for greater
reductions of benzene in the drydocks, or adopting alternative
compliance strategies for hydrocarbons.93 Not surprisingly, the
study recommended that EPA should change its regulatory
policies to encourage IPC. 94 How then are we still operating
under a fragmented system of environmental policy and law? The
answer requires a short excursus into the modem history of
pollution control.
A. The Reasons for Fragmentation
The 1960s witnessed two different currents of thinking. On
the one hand, environmentalism in the late 1960s was rooted in
holistic and ecological thinking, as expressed by the enactment
of NEPA and the creation of the EPA. On the other hand, the cry
for environmental protection in the 1960s cast serious doubts
about the New Deal belief that independent and expert
administrative agencies were capable of creatively regulating a
complex social problem in the public interest.9"
Legislative mandates grounded upon suspicion and doubt
about expertise may adversely affect the application of ecological
principles based on interconnected ecosystems and a holistic
world view.96 Ecologicalism sees air, water, and land as part of
one environment, and not as separate and discrete entities.
Complex and interrelated environmental problems do not simply
direct us to preordained solutions. Pollution control, therefore,
requires a dynamic and ongoing process of balancing and
management that could best be done by expert and sensitive
agencies, who are vested with comprehensive power and the
authority to respond to the particular circumstances of the case.
An integrated approach calls for a broad delegation of power.
The early influence of these ideas motivated unsuccessful
legislative attempts, beginning ten years before NEPA, to unify
conservation, resource, and environmental policy. 7 Then, in
1968, an important report of the Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development of the House Committee on Science
and Astronautics, entitled Managing the Environment,98
93. AMOCO, supra note 92, at ix, 1-16; Mank, Exception Process, supra note 92,
at 325.
94. See Mank, Project XL, supra note 92, at 13.
95. See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 75, at 1468.
96. See Guruswamy, supra note 71, at 509-10 n.222-227.
97. See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE CouRTS 4 (1973).
.98. HousE SUBCOMM. ON Sci., RESEARCH, AND DEv., 90TH CONG., CONGRESSIONAL
WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (COmM. print 19681.
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recommended that a national policy for the environment be
adopted.9 9 The need for integration was also reflected in the even
more important Congressional White Paper on a National Policy
for the Environment.' 00
B. National Environmental Policy Act"0 1
NEPA was the outcome of two bills, one introduced in the
House by Congressman John Dingell, 02  and the other
introduced in the Senate by the architect of NEPA, Senator
Henry Jackson.'0 3 Professor Lynton Caldwell acted as consultant
for Jackson and his committee. The writings of both Jackson
and Caldwell testify to their commitment to integration. ° 4
Jackson felt that the legislative responses to the environmental
problems in the 1960s were sporadic and uncoordinated, and
that NEPA provided "both a conceptual basis and legal sanction"
for a more coordinated and systematic method of dealing with
environmental problems. 0 5 He also noted that in order to
produce a truly integrated and national environmental policy,
bills had been introduced to establish a National Environmental
Policy Institute, a Department of Natural Resources, and a
national land use policy. ' ° 6
Unhappily, the legislative history of NEPA also points in a
different direction, and requires some clarification. To begin with,
although Senator Jackson was clearly impressed with the need
99. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON SCI., RESEARCH, AND DEv.. 90TH CONG., MANAGING THE
ENVIRONMENT (Comm. print 1968).
100. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCI.
AND ASTRONAUTICS, 90TH CONG., CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL POLICY FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT (Comm. print 1968).
101. The tortuous joumey involved before a bill becomes law, together with the
various procedural steps referred to in parts of this Article are succinctly discussed in
WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS G. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS
AND THE STATES 35 (6th ed. 1985).
102. H.R. 6750, 91st Cong., 45 CONG. REC. 3415 (1969).
103. S. 1075, 91st Cong., 45 CONG. REC. 19,008 (1969).
104. In his book Environment: A Challenge for Modem Society. Professor Caldwell
argues that there had, until recently, been no perceived need for general or
comprehensive policies of environmental administration and control, and that
management had extended only to specific aspects of the environment. LYNTON KEITH
CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE FOR MODERN SOCIETY 163-232 [1970). He
notes, however, that an ecologically based environmental policy should be
characterized by comprehensiveness of policy and control and operative
arrangements. Indeed his whole book is premised upon the analog of a "spaceship
earth" which depends for its survival upon coordinated and interrelated systems.
105. Henry M. Jackson, Environmental Policy and the Congress, I1 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 403, 407 (1971).
106. Id. at 411-13.
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for integration, neither his bill (S. 1075)107 nor Congressman
Dingell's (H.R. 6750)108 mentioned integrated environmental
policies or even a national environmental policy. The reason for
this appears to be that both Senator Jackson and Congressman
Dingell may have been trying to avert a turf battle over
committee jurisdiction. Senator Jackson had to deal with
Senator Edmund Muskie, chairman of the influential
Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Committee on Public Works that sponsored air and water
pollution legislation. For his part, Congressman Dingell had to
contend with Wayne Aspinall, Chairman of the House Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee, who in fact emerged as one of
NEPA's strongest opponents. 0 9 This explanation is borne out by
the fact that important amendments were made to S. 1075
during its hearings before Jackson's Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs. Some of the most significant amendments were
made because of Professor Caldwell's promptings. 0 These
amendments incorporated the concept of environmental impact
assessments."' In the House, the Subcommittee on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries reported a "clean bill," H.R. 12549,112
which was practically identical to H.R. 6750.111
For his part, Senator Muskie also succeeded in obtaining
amendments before the Senate forwarded its bill to the
conference committee. The apparent thrust of Senator Muskie's
amendments was to ensure that air and water standards set
under legislation being drafted by his Subcommittee, or falling
within its jurisdiction, would not be affected by NEPA. The new
section of NEPA which sought to achieve Senator Muskie's
107. S. 1075, supra note 103.
108. H.R. 6750, supra note 102.
109. See ANDERSON, supra note 97, at 5; see also Barry S. Neuman, Comment,
Implementation of the Clean Air Act: Should NEPA Apply to the Environmental
Protection Agency?, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 597, 600-02 (1973) (discussing NEPA's "nebulous
legislative history" in contrast to its "clear statutory directive").
110. See ANDERSON, supra note 97, at 6; see also JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0.
McGARrrY, THE LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 6-7 (1984).
111. Caldwell's testimony led to inclusion of action-forcing provisions. The bill
containing those provisions was passed on July 10, 1969. ANDERSON, supra note 97,
at 6 (citing 115 CONG. REC. 19,008-13 (1969)).
112. Id.
113. See ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: HEARINGS ON H.R. 6750, BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.
ON FISHERIES AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON MERCH. MARINE AND
FISHERIES, 91st Cong. (1969).
[Vol. 27:11911214
2001] INTEGRATION & BIOCOMPLEXITY 1215
objectives was Section 104.114 It was ambiguously worded and
did not plainly and clearly support Senator Muskie's objective
that air and water pollution legislation should be exempted from
NEPA. 11 5 As Judge Leventhal concluded in Portland Cement Ass'n
v. Ruckeishaus,'"6 "[tihere is no express exemption in the
language of the Act or Committee Reports."" 7 With a view to
remedying this ambiguity, when the Conference Report on NEPA
reached the floor of the Senate, an attempt was made at the last
minute to clarify the legislative history of Section 104 so that it
could be interpreted to exempt environmentally protective federal
activities from NEPA obligations."1 8 This attempt took the form of
a document introduced into the Congressional Record by
Senator Jackson during debate over approval of the Conference
Report. Jackson's document stated that Section 102"' 9 was
aimed primarily at "those agencies who now have little or no
legislative authority to take environmental considerations into
account,"20 and that Section 103 21 was "aimed at those agencies
which have little or no authority to consider environmental
values." 2 2 While this may have lent support to Muskie's views,
the same document went on to say, that Section 102 was "clearly
designed to assure consideration of environmental matters by all
agencies in their planning and decision making." 23 Senator
114. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1994).
"Nothing in section 4332 or 4333 of this title shall in any way affect the specific
statutory obligations of any Federal agency (1) to comply with criteria or standards of
environmental quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other Federal or State
agency, or (3) to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon the recommendations or
certification of any other Federal or State agency.' Id.
115. See ANDERSON, supra note 97, at 8 (citing 115 CONG. REc. 29,046-063,
29,066-099, 40,923-928; 116 CONG. REc. 8984).
116. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
117. Id. at 381 (citing S. REP. No. 91-296 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-765 (1969]).
118. See Anderson, supra note 97, at 106, see also 115 CONG. REc. 40,417 (1969);
115 CONG. REc 29,056, 29,058-59 (1969); Comment, Landmark Decision on the
National Environmental Policy Act: Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 1 ENVTL. L. REp. 10125 (1971).
119. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994). Section 102 placed a duty on "all
agencies of the Federal Government" to prepare environmental impact statements in
.every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. (emphasis
supplied).
120. See 115 CONG. REc. 40,418 (1969).
121. NEPA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1994). Section 103 directed all agencies of the
Federal Government to bring their policies and procedures into full compliance with
NEPA.
122. 115 CONG. REc. 40,418 (1969).
123. Id. On a subsequent occasion when the amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act were being debated, Senator Jackson concluded that EPA
should not be exempt from NEPA. See 118 CONG. REC. 10,271 (1971).
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Muskie, responding to Senator Jackson's document, stated that
the clear understanding between Senator Jackson and himself
was that the legislative mandates of agencies having
environmental protection duties were not changed in any way by
Section 104 of NEPA. 2 4 Whatever the nature of this
understanding between Senators Jackson and Muskie, it was
not formalized in any statement in the Conference Report. As
Senator Allott, a member of the Interior and Conference
Committees said, "Only the conference report itself was signed
by all the Senate conferees, and therefore, only it was agreed
upon and is binding. "125 In a like vein, Judge Skelly Wright
observed in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Commission v. United
States Atomic Energy Commission,'26
This rather meager legislative history, in our view, cannot
radically transform the purport of the plain words of Section
104. Had the Senate sponsors fully intended to allow a total
abdication of NEPA responsibilities in water quality
matters-rather than a supplementing of them by strict
obedience to the specific standards of Water Quality
Improvement Act (WQIA)- the language of Section 104 could
easily have been changed.' 27
Citing the Supreme Court, Judge Wright stated that "the
legislative history of a statute (particularly such relatively meager
and vague history as we have here) cannot radically affect its
interpretation if the language of the statute is clear." 2 ' Indeed,
Section 102 states quite explicitly and unambiguously that it
applies to "all agencies of the Federal Government."
129
The interventions of Senators Jackson and Muskie are
perhaps best understood as an attempt to protect the "turf of
committee jurisdiction rather than as an attempt to strike at the
integrative functions of NEPA.'30 In any event, this legislative
history, that was concerned with, and indeed confined to the
applicability of NEPA to air and water controls, could not have
been directed at EPA, which was not yet born. Eventually, EPA
124. See 115 CONG. REc. 40,423 (1969).
125. Id. at 40,422.
126. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Atomic Energy Commission had recently
passed new rules. Petitioners argued that the AEC failed to consider environmental
matters to the extent required by NEPA. The AEC contended that the rules were
within the broad scope of NEPA.
127. Id. at 1126.
128. Id.
129. NEPA § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1994).
130. See Guruswamy, supra note 71, at 484-86.
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was clearly granted an authority that extended beyond air and
water at its inception.
C. The Creation of the Environmental Protection Agency
Six months after the enactment of NEPA, President Nixon
established two new agencies by executive order: the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)131 and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).1 3 2  In
establishing these two agencies, Nixon made the case for
controlling cross-media pollution in an integrated manner. It
would be fair to conclude that the notion of comprehensive
management and integration undergirded the creation of EPA,
and was based upon the ecological ideas and concepts referred
to above.' 33 Nixon observed that since environmental problems
131. For text of plan see MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 3, H.R. MIsC. DOC. NO. 91-364 (1970).
132. For text of plan see MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 4, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 91-365 (1970). The five major
programs moved to EPA were: water pollution, which had formerly been carried out
by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration in the Interior Department; air
pollution formerly executed by the National Air Pollution Control Administration in
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW); solid waste management,
drinking water quality, and radiological health also from HEW; pesticides regulation
and research from the Food and Drug Administration and the Agriculture
Department; and ambient standard setting for radiation from the Atomic Energy
Commission. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT 25 (1970). For further information on the Reorganization Plans see MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RELATIVE TO REORGANIZATION PLANS 3 AND 4
OF 1970, H.R. MISC. Doc. NO. 91-366 (1970): COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS,
APPROVING REORGANIZATION PLAN 3 OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 91-1464 (1970); COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, APPROVING REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 4 OF 1970, 91st Cong.
(1970): Reorganization Plans Nos. 3 and 4 of 1970: Hearings Before A Subcommittee of
the Committee on Government Operations, 91st Cong. (1970).
133. While Nixon's commitment to environmental protection may be open to some
doubt, it seems reasonably clear that his approach towards integration was
consistent with his beliefs. He believed that government should be organized around
functions (overriding existing divisions) rather than along programs (based on
existing sectoral legislation). His administration made efforts to coordinate programs
in a number of policy areas. See Kenneth T. Palmer, The Evolution of Grant Policies, in
THE CHANGING POLITICS OF FEDERAL GRANTS 5, 24-25 (Lawrence D. Brown. James W.
Fossett, & Kenneth T. Palmer eds., 1984); JOHN C. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE:
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY IN THE NIXON-FoRD YEARS 46 (1976); see
also BARRY G. RABE. FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION IN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT 15 (1986). Moreover, during Congressional hearings on NEPA, President
Nixon had issued an executive order establishing an interagency Environmental
Quality Council with broad responsibilities for coordinating federal environmental
policy. See Exec. Order No. 11,472, 34 Fed. Reg. 8693 (1969), amended by, Exec.
Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970), Exec. Order No. 12,007, 42 Fed. Reg.
42,839 (1977), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321, at 507 (1982). Alfred Marcus has
concluded that the Nixon Administration's commitment to administrative integration
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should be "perceived as a single, interrelated system," the then-
existing piecemeal federal efforts were inappropriate.
1 34
Consolidating anti-pollution activities into one agency, therefore,
"would help assure that we do not create new environmental
problems in the process of controlling existing ones."13 5 He hoped
that by combining programs that were previously housed in
several separate agencies, the government would be able to
"mount an effectively coordinated campaign against
environmental degradation in all of its many forms."1"6
Despite its complexity, for pollution control purposes the
environment must be perceived as a single interrelated
system.... A single source may pollute the air with smoke
and chemicals, the land with solid wastes, and a river or lake
with chemicals and other wastes. Control of the air pollution
may produce more solid wastes which then pollute the land
or water. Control of the water-polluting effluent may convert
it into solid wastes which must be disposed of on land.... A
far more effective approach to pollution control would:
[i]dentify pollutants; [tirace them through the entire ecological
chain, observing and recording changes in form as they
occur; [dietermine the total exposure of man and his
environment; [eixamine interactions among forms of
pollution; and [ildentify where in the ecological chain
interdiction would be most appropriate. 1
37
President Nixon returned to this theme in his President's
Message that accompanied the first report to Congress on the
state of the nation's environment, by stressing that EPA would
consolidate the fragmented responsibilities of various pollution
control agencies. He emphasized again that "[alir pollution, water
pollution, and solid wastes are different forms of a single
problem," and that it was evident that a different approach was
necessary. President Nixon felt that reorganization under EPA,
together with the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),
which had been charged by the President with coordinating all
was in fact based upon ecological thinking. ALFRED A. MARCUS, PROMISE AND
PERFORMANCE CHOOSING AND IMPLEMENTING AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 31-32 (1980).
134. The President's Message to the Congress upon Transmitting Reorganization
Plans to Establish the Two Agencies, 6 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 908 (July 13,
1970).
135. Id. at 911.
136. Id. at 912.
137. Message from the United States President Relative to Reorganization Plans 3
and 4 of 1970, reprinted in U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 132, at 295.
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environmental quality programs," 8  would now make this
possible. 9
Arguments for integration based on ecological thinking were
countered by others who resisted the granting of wide
discretionary power. During the New Deal, champions of the
administrative process assumed that there was an objective
public interest that could be ascertained and implemented by
expert administrators. 40  Political scientists attacked these
views 4' on constitutional and political grounds. The
constitutional objection to the granting of wide discretionary
authority to executive agencies appears to have been resolved by
the use of the "intelligible principle."142 Arguably, by doing so the
courts removed any insurmountable legal roadblock preventing
the granting of wide powers to specialized executive agencies.
Nevertheless, the political arguments for not granting wide
discretion to executive agencies appear to have prevailed. Those
attacking the technocratic philosophy on political grounds
138. Id. The CEQ also stressed the need for integration and coordination in its
first report. See id. at 24-27.
139. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 132, at viii.
140. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law. 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669. 1682-85 (1975); Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 75, at 1674-
75; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421,
460-61 (1987).
141. Louis L. Jaffe, The Independent Agency-A New Scapegoat, 65 YALE L.J.
1068 (1956): see also Louis L. Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental
Control, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 231, 232 (1970) (pointing out that lawyers, as distinct
from political scientists, were partial to the independent administrative agencies)
[hereinafter Jaffe, The Administrative Agencyl.
142. Article 1. Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "[all
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."
In essence, the constitutional argument raised was that Congress could not delegate
these powers to executive agencies because executive agencies ought to be subject to
presidential not Congressional control. Moreover, the executive agencies were hybrid
institutions- a headless fourth branch of government that combined powers
previously distributed among the three traditional branches of government. The
courts, however, recognized the practical need for Congress to delegate their
functions to executive agencies provided there was "an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized [to exercise the delegated authority] is to conform."
J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (upholding
delegation to the President under the Tariff Act of 1922 to set flexible tariffs). To date,
there are only two decisions, both occurring in 1935, that invalidate an Act of
Congress by invoking the "intelligible principle" rule under the non-delegation
doctrine. Despite this, the Court of Appeals in the recent case, American Trucking
Assocs. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1998), modified on rehearing by 195 F.3d 4
(D.C. Cir. 1999). affd in part, rev'd in part, - S. Ct. -, 2001 WL 182549 (Feb. 27,
2001), found that the EPA had violated the non-delegation doctrine by setting
nationwide standards for clean air without articulating an "intelligible principle" to
constrain its authority. See 175 F.3d at 1034. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER &
RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAWAND REGULATORY POLICY 128 (2d ed. 1985).
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charged that independent agencies, having no duly constituted
master, were falling under the domination of private interests,
usually the very interests whose activities they were supposed to
regulate. 4 3 Economists leveled a somewhat different criticism.
They saw regulation as being inefficient because it was created
and administered for the benefit of well-organized interests at the
expense of the public. These critics advocated either deregulation
or regulatory reform. Ironically, political and economic critics of
regulation agreed that regulation benefited the regulated
industries rather than the public. 44
By the end of the 1960s, much of the regulation in the
United States was seen to be in "deep -trouble."'45 It became
necessary to face up to the problem of how agencies misused
and even abused the broadly delegated power conferred upon
them. Confidence in the ability of administrative agencies to
implement statutes effectively and in the public interest
apparently evaporated. Many influential commentators referred
to the problems arising out of the unsatisfactory implementation
of the legislative mandates given to administrative agencies. They
suggested that one way to remedy this problem was to enact new
statutes with clear mandates and definite obligations. 
46
Marver Bernstein set up an influential model of agency
obsolescence in which he traced the cycle of a regulatory agency
from gestation to youth, youth to maturity, and maturity to old
age. Bernstein's model suggests that in old age, the agency
suffered debility and decline and "surrendered" to the
regulated.' 47 One reason for the malaise lay in the nature of the
legislative mandate. According to Bernstein, statutory mandates
lack clarity and rarely provide clear directions to the new
143. E.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969), ROBERT C. FELLMETH, INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC (1970): JAMES S. TURNER. THE
CHEMICAL FEAST (1970).
144. See PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1970):
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971). For a succinct survey of these criticisms, see BREYER & STEWART, supra note
142, at 36-38.
145. ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH COUNCIL
PROPOSALS 110 (1971]. Whether this perception was valid is open to question. See
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
146. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
286 (1955); KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 9-53 (1958); HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF
STANDARDS (1962): LOwi, supra note 143.
147. BERNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 74-102.
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agency. 4 The vagueness, he suggests, was deliberate and
resulted from the lobbying of well-organized private groups who
were the subject of the regulation. Having failed in their efforts to
prevent the enactment of legislation affecting them, confident
that they could capture the agency in question, the regulated
interests groups concentrated on making the regulatory
provisions as vague and innocuous as possible.'49  The
unwillingness or inability of Congress to give better directives to
its agencies was also criticized by Judge Friendly. 5 o
Professor K.C. Davis, in his Administrative Law Treatise and
later in Discretionary Justice,' demonstrated with compelling
and devastating effects the injustice and dangers of
unnecessarily wide delegation of discretionary power. In his book
The End of Liberalism,"2 Theodore Lowi synthesized the
criticisms of Davis and other authors and suggested that one
remedy for many of the troubles of agencies might lie in statutes
that had clear goals and explicit means of implementation.1
5 3
These new statutory norms would target and institutionalize the
public needs that led to the statute in the first place and would
make it difficult for the agency to postpone the performance of its
obligations. 154 One of the central themes present in the climate of
policy opinion, therefore, was that expertise could be an excuse
for inaction and, even worse, could be captured by special
interests. Believers in regulation suggested enacting legislation
setting forth explicit goals, specific means by which these goals
could be attained, and rigorous timetables in which to do so.
Foundational legislation enacted in the 1970s, such as the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, reflected a deep mistrust of
administrative agency expertise and decisionmaking. This
resulted in agencies being directed to comply with legislatively
ordained mandates and specific deadlines. One of the
unfortunate outcomes of such legislation was that it prevented
agencies from taking a more integrated and comprehensive
approach to abating pollution.
148. Id. at 75-76.
149. See id. at 96.
150. FRIENDLY, supra note 146, at 168.
151. See DAVIS, supra note 146; KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1977).
152. See LowI, supra note 143.
153. This was not the only suggested method of relief. There were demands that
the agencies should redeem their New Deal promise by generating clear standards
through creative rulemaking. See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 75, at 1479.
Another solution was to look to the courts for action. See Jaffe, The Administrative
Agency, supra note 141, at 235.
154. See LowI, supra note 143, at 125-56.
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D. The Political Context
A fragmented approach to legislation also arose from the way
in which jurisdiction over environmental legislation was carved
up between Congressional committees. '5 Environmental
legislation is almost entirely drafted and piloted through
Congress by committees. It is a rare occurrence for a committee
decision to be overturned by the full House or Senate."' The
committees responsible for various aspects of environmental law
and policy guard their jurisdiction jealously. It has been pointed
out that "jurisdictional politics is an ubiquitous feature of
present day congressional policy making. To hold jurisdiction
means to claim a piece of the action. Therefore, jurisdiction is as
central to the life of a member or a congressional sub-unit as
votes or the ability to hire staff."
1 57
In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Subcommittee on
Air and Water Pollution Control of the Public Works Committee
maintained primary responsibility for air and water pollution
legislation. Senator Muskie, who had become the dominant
Congressional figure in pollution control, headed this
committee. 1 8 Another committee that assumed some influence
and importance in formulating environmental policy was the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, chaired by Senator
Jackson. Senator Jackson was the architect of NEPA, which
sought to place environmental policy within an integrated
framework. 9 Senator Muskie resisted attempts to extend NEPA
155. Committee jurisdiction covers three areas: (a) formulation and approval of
legislation: (b) the conducting of oversight hearings and investigations: and (c) the
reviewing and approval of appropriations. See J. CLARENCE DAvWES & BARBARA S.
DAVIES, THE POLMrICS OF POLLUTION 61-79 (2d ed. 1975).
156. See id. at 6 1.
157. Roger H. Davidson, Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy
Making, in THE NEW CONGRESS 118-19 (Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein eds.,
1981).
158. See DAVIES & DAvIES, supra note 155, at 63-66; MARCus, supra note 133, at
53-78.
159. NEPA's basic substantive policy was to ensure that the federal government
"use all practicable means and measures" to protect environmental values, avoid
environmental degradation, preserve historic, cultural, and natural resources, and
promote the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without undesirable
or unintended consequences. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1994). Congress directed that to the
fullest extent possible, the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with NEPA, and that all agencies
of the federal government should follow the procedures set out in NEPA. Id. § 4332.
The procedures set out that responsible officials of all agencies should prepare a
detailed statement covering the impact of particular actions on the environment, the
environmental costs that might be avoided, and alternative measures that might alter
the cost-benefit ratio. See IcL § 4332(21(c).
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to air and water pollution control agencies. At one level his
approach to NEPA was an exercise in turf protection.
6°
Accordingly, it has been suggested that Senator Muskie was
more concerned with keeping air and water pollution control
under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee of the Senate Public
Works Committee, which he chaired, than with preventing
integration. He was engaged in the characteristic gambit of
preventing encroachment on the agencies under his committee
by Senator Jackson's Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,
which drafted NEPA. 11 Unfortunately, whatever his motives, the
effect of his actions on pollution policies was to entrench
fragmentation at the expense of integration.
Political writers such as James Q. Wilson have explained
and substantiated the symbiotic political relationship between
public interest activists and subcommittee chairmen interested
in gaining national prominence. 162 However, what occurred with
the Clean Air Act was strikingly different. Muskle was the chief
architect of the air and water pollution legislation passed by
Congress in the 1960s, and his Senate Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution began drafting amendments to the Clean Air Act
in 1970. John Esposito, in Vanishing Air, documented the extent
to which Ralph Nader's intervention led to a dramatic tightening
of the provisions of the final bill presented by Muskie's
committee." Vanishing Air also reveals the extent to which
Muskie's espoused presidential candidacy in 1972 made him
160. Professors Ackerman and Stewart have noted that powerful organized
interests such as Congressional committees have vested interests in protecting the
status quo. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1333-34 (1985).
161. Neuman, supra note 109. at 602: Comment, Kalur v. Resor, Water Quality
and NEPA's Application to EPA, 2 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvrL. L. INST.) 10025, 10029 (1972)
[hereinafter Water Quality]. For a seemingly contrary view, see Liroff, who suggests
that. "While the Senators' disagreements were largely based on jurisdictional
jealousies, they derived as well from a fundamental difference in outlook concerning
the manner in which protection for environmental values should be provided in
federal decision making." RICHARD A. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
11 (1976). It would seem, however, that this 'fundamental difference' related to the
efficacy of policing NEPA, and not to the need for integrated environmental evaluation
and action. See td. at 18-20.
162. See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT 145 (J. McKie ed., 1974).
163. See JOHN C. EsPosrro, VANISHING AIR (1970): see also MARCUS, supra note
133, at 53-85; ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT: POLITICS. POLLUTION AND FEDERAL POLICY 23-24 (1981) [hereinafter
ACIR]; Donald Elliot. Bruce Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
313 (1985).
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especially vulnerable to political pressure of the entrepreneurial
kind.
James Q. Wilson suggests four different manifestations of
the politics of legislation and regulation: majoritarian, interest
group, client, and entrepreneurial. Wilson argues that the Clean
Air Act of 1970 was not the result of interest group politics but of
the entrepreneurial politics of Ralph Nader.'6 Wilson's
explanation is consistent with an arresting theory of the
"prisoners dilemma" offered by Elliot, Ackerman, and Millian.1 65
They argue that the Clean Air Act was enacted at a time when
environmentalists were not well organized as an interest group in
Washington. However, it was a time in which two presidential
aspirants, President Nixon and Senator Muskie, 66 competed
164. WILSON, supra note 145, at 367-70. Traditional interest group politics see
legislation as the outcome of a competitive struggle among groups with differing
interests. However, Wilson's persuasive analysis limits the application of interest
group politics to situations in which the public at large do not see themselves being
affected by a regulation. A regulation attracting interest group politics will typically
benefit a small group at the expense of a comparable small group. Each side has a
strong incentive to organize and exercise political influence. Majoritarian politics are
found where the costs and benefits of a contemplated action are widely distributed
and most of society is expected to gain or pay. Interest groups have little incentive to
form around such issues because no small definable segment of society such as an
industry or occupation or locality can expect to capture a disproportionate share of
the benefits. Where costs and benefits are narrowly concentrated, conditions are ripe
for interest group politics. Where the benefits of a prospective policy are concentrated
but the costs widely distributed, client politics is likely to result. Some small easily
organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to organize and lobby.
Since the costs of the benefit are distributed at a low per capita rate over a large
number of people, there is little incentive to organize in opposition. Finally, where a
policy is proposed that will confer general but small benefits at a cost to be borne
chiefly by a small segment of society, we witness entrepreneurial politics. Where this
is the case, the incentive to organize is strong for opponents of the policy but weak
for the beneficiaries while the political system provides many points at which
opposition can be registered. In these circumstances, it requires the efforts of a
skilled entrepreneur who can mobilize latent public sentiment, associate the
legislation with widely shared values and put the opponents of the plan publicly on
the defensive.
165. See Elliot, Ackerman & Mililan, supra note 163, at 313; see also Ackerman &
Millian, TOWARD A THEORY OF STATUTORY EVOLUTION; THE FEDERALIZATION OF
ENViRONMENTAL LAW 2, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985). The Prisoner's Dilemma is a
classic game theory problem that has been exhaustively canvassed by the literature
in game theory. economics, philosophy, biology, sociology, and political science. It is
a story of two prisoners who are arrested by the police near the scene of a burglary
and illustrates the conflicts between what Is a rational choice for an individual
member of a group, and for the group as a whole. It helps us understand how such a
dilemma can be resolved. See generally, ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION (1984).
166. Senator Muskie was chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works. He had been involved in
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without restraint for credit to be gained from legislation assuring
the public of a cleaner world. In 1970, Muskie was vulnerable
not only because he was a presidential candidate but also
because the 1967 Air Quality Act that he had drafted was not
working satisfactorily.'67 Elliot, Ackerman, and Millian's theory
appears to be well substantiated by the sequence of events
leading up to the enactment of the Clean Air Act. On December
10, 1969, Muskie introduced a bill that sought little more than
an incremental change to the law controlling air pollution."16 Two
months later Nixon submitted his own proposals to Congress,
calling for a far more substantial change in the law, necessitating
a major structural change in existing federal air pollution
statutes. 69 Three weeks after Nixon's proposal, Nader's task
force published their report harshly criticizing Muskie and
alleging that he was soft on industry.' In August, Muskie's
subcommittee reported a revised bill that essentially followed the
outcome of Nixon's proposals but was much tougher than
Nixon's proposal. Muskie's tougher and more stringent law (the
1970 Clean Air Act) was subsequently signed into law by Nixon
despite his grave reservations over the exacting demands the law
made on industry. Elliot's conclusions are that Nader's report
threatening Muskie with the loss of his reputation as Mr. Clean
had the effect of trapping both Nixon and Muskie in a politician's
dilemma. The report compounded pressure on both politicians
by exploiting the difficulty the public had in identifying
politicians who deserved credit for enacting legislation in
response to perceived need. As a result, both were forced to
support legislation more stringent than either would have
preferred.
pollution control for many years and was a front runner among Democratic
candidates. See generally, MARCUS, supra note 133, at 53-82.
167. See id.
168. Marcus' characterization of it as a "minor tinkering" with the 1967 law has
been endorsed by Elliot et al. See Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 163 at 60.
169. See PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS RECOMMENDING A 37 POINT
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM. WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 160, 164 (Feb.
10, 1975). The proposals, though advocating a qualitative change to the existing
structure of air pollution by establishing nationwide air quality standards and
national emission standards, was still fragmented in its approach and dealt with air,
water, and solid waste management as If they were independent and separate
problems. The message, however, did recognize that federal institutions dealing with
the environment and natural resources had developed piecemeal over the years, and
indicated that Nixon had appointed Roy Ash to make a thorough study of the
organization of federal environmental, natural resource, and oceanographic
programs. Id. at 171. It was the work of the Ash Council reorganization study that
laid the foundations for EPA. See generally, MARCUS, supra note 133, at 31-52.
170. See Esposrro. supra note 163, at 290-92.
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Unfortunately, the Ralph Nader organization, while executing
a remarkable coup, also succeeded in further entrenching the
fragmented approach. Although they expressed scathing
criticism of the bureaucratic inertia displayed by the National Air
Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA) in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), Esposito and Nader
displayed little awareness of the interrelated nature of the
problem of air pollution. They denigrated the difficulties of
pollution control caused by the need to relate emission
standards to ambient air quality standards. They ridiculed
NAPCA's reliance on experts. Underlying their criticisms was a
deep suspicion of the view that the atmosphere should be used
to its optimal capacity. This concept was seen as the basis on
which corporate polluters exploited and plundered the
environment in city after city. 7 2 Overall, these criticisms
reflected dissatisfaction with bureaucratic implementation and
disillusionment with the New Deal ideal of expert administrators.
The Nader answer, insofar as one was offered, appeared to be a
visible and simple one. It lay in clear national emission
standards. 173 That proposal was only partially adopted by the
Clean Air Act. Instead, Muskie's committee finally set forth
explicit goals accompanied by defined means, clear deadlines,
and rigorous timetables in an attempt to meet Nader's criticisms.
In so doing, Muskie's committee sought "handles"74 on
environmental degradation connected to fragmented,
incremental, and credit-seeking solutions to the problems of
dirty air.
E. The Environmental Protection Agency and Integration
The Nixon administration created the EPA with the specific
objective of integrating the various legislative mandates
entrusted to it. Nixon envisioned an EPA that would end much of
the fragmentation of environmental policy. Douglas Costle, who
later became EPA's Administrator, directed the White House task
force that handled the transition between Congressional
approval of the reorganization and the actual start of EPA's
operations. Costle concluded that although reorganization along
171. See id. at vii-ix. (R. Nader commenting in foreword to the book).
172. See U at 259-98.
173. See id. at 307.
174. See MARCUS, supra note 133, at 70-71.
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functional lines was the desired long term goal, an incremental
strategy was preferable in the short term. 1
75
Costle recommended a three-stage plan. Initially, the five
programs dealing with air, water, pesticides, solids waste and
radiation, and noise would be preserved. After a period of time
three new assistant administrative offices would be created along
functional lines, dealing with Planning and Management,
Standards and Compliance, and Research and Monitoring. The
five individual programs would temporarily be allowed to retain
their separate identity in the remaining administrative offices.
Finally, after the passage of a reasonable amount of time, the
program distinctions were to be eliminated entirely. I6
There were a number of reasons for Costle's caution in
pushing forward with integration. First, the differing policy
streams leading to the creation of EPA and the passage of the
1970 Clean Air Act proceeded along parallel paths.'77 The White
House's vision of comprehensive environmental management
leading to the creation of EPA was not a vision shared by
Congress or embodied in the Clean Air Act of 1970.
Consequently, EPA mirrored a curious policy division. On the
one hand, it housed those loyal to the original philosophy of
NEPA and EPA, while on the other hand it was staffed by those
committed to a programmatic administration based on
fragmented policies. EPA's structure was unprecedented in terms
of the number and size of disparate agencies brought under a
new organizational roof.'78 In many cases, the agencies had been
rivals who enjoyed substantial autonomy. Costle reasoned that
there would be resistance and disruption if integration were
attempted immediately.'79 Most bureaucrats within EPA had a
program perspective. They were tied to specific legislation,
175. See l. at 104.
176. Seeid.at70-71.
177. See td. at 54-57.
178. There were ten major administrative units in all. The Federal Water Quality
Administration from the Interior Department was the largest with 2,670 personnel
and a budget of over $1,000 million. The National Air Pollution Control
Administration from HEW was second with 1,100 personnel and a budget of $110
million. Other major units included the Pesticides Regulation Division from the
Agriculture Department with 425 personnel, the Bureau of Radiological Health from
HEW with 350 and the Office of Pesticides Research from HEW with 275. Stephen A.
Cohen, EPA: A Qualified Success, in CONTRovERSIES N ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 179
(Sheldon Kamienieki et al. eds., 1986).
179. See MARCUS, supra note 133, at 103-04; see also DAVIES & DAvIES, supra
note 155, at 107-12; ACIR, supra note 163, at 22: WILLIAM R. AHERN, ORGANIZING FOR
POLLUTION CONTROL: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
ADMINISTRATION 1970-1971 (1973) (providing further information on Costle's role).
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functions, and appropriations. They took their cues from
Congress, and reflected the pragmatic, fragmented policies of
that body. 180
Second, Costle feared that the agency would undergo a
period of confusion and even chaos while its programmatic
inheritance was broken down and rebuilt along functional
lines. 18 ' The resulting confusion could prevent it from meeting
the obligations of its legislative mandates, particularly the
inflexible demands of the Clean Air Act. These concerns were
compounded by the fear that managers of EPA's program
sections would not go along with a fully integrated plan.
William Ruckelshaus, EPA's first administrator, appeared to
be even more apprehensive than Costle. He accepted and carried
out the first two stages of Costle's plan, but he did not
implement the third phase, which was to fully integrate EPA. 182 It
would seem that the primary reason for this was that even the
limited division of duties Costle had brought about led to conflict
and restlessness. Apart from being nervous about their position
and prospects in a new organization, the bureaucrats he
inherited from other departments and programs were loyal to
specific statutes and programs and were unable to view the
environment as a whole. These bureaucrats were familiar with,
and committed to particular legislative mandates, and they
feared that the concrete directives were in danger of being
ignored in the move toward integration. They also had access to
Senators and Representatives of Congressional committees who
enacted such legislation, and who continued to supervise their
implementation. Faced by the prospect of bureaucratic
resistance and Congressional criticism, Ruckelshaus decided to
"play it safe."'8 3 These initial rumblings of discontent, signifying a
180. See DAVIES & DAVIES, supra note 155, at 108.
181. See MARCUS, supra note 133, at 103.
182. See id. (initial history of the EPA); see also DAVIES & DAVIES, supra note 155,
at 108-18 (creation of EPA). EPA began as a wholly program-based administration
and was then modified into one which was partly programmatic and partly
functional. Three Assistant Administrators were appointed with responsibility along
functional lines for: (a) Planning and Management; (b) Enforcement and General
Counsel; (c) Research and Monitoring. The other Assistant Administrators remained
in charge of particular regulatory programs. Id. The Ruckelshaus design remains
basically unchanged up to date and "continues to be stuck in the same half-
programmatic, half functional pattern." Terry Davies, The United States: Experiment
and Fragmentation, in INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA,
at 51-66 (Nigel Haigh & Frances Irwin eds., 1990).
183. MARCUS, supra note 133, at 101-06; see also Alfred Marcus, Environmental
Protection Agency, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, supra note 145, at 275-77. It may
be possible to explain his behavior on the basis that the crucial concern of any
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bureaucratic preference for fragmentation, led to a special
pleading that EPA be excluded from NEPA, and they set the stage
for EPA's virtual rejection of an integrated approach.
In several cases in which the issue was raised,184 EPA
insisted that it was not bound by the provisions of NEPA and
sought to justify its position on broad policy grounds. The
foundation of EPA's policy argument was based on the nature of
the objectives and deadlines embodied in the statutes EPA
administers, especially the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.
These acts, objectives, and deadlines require rapid action that
would be delayed by the time involved in complying with NEPA
procedures. Further, EPA argued that both acts preclude
consideration of the environment as a whole, and, by
implication, stand in the way of an integrated approach to
pollution control.
These arguments were advanced in Anaconda Co. v.
Ruckelshaus,15 in which a plaintiff industry sought to
demonstrate that the control strategy and emission standard for
sulfur dioxide proposed by EPA with reference to state
implementation plans would create an "enormous solid waste
disposal problem." ' The District Court's holding that EPA
should comply with NEPA was vacated on appeal on the ground
that EPA's action was not subject to judicial review because the
proposed regulation had not yet been adopted.8 7 The reasoning
of the District Court in Anaconda was rejected as "myopic" in
agency head is how to maintain the agency as a viable, credible, steady institution
rather than to make decisions that achieve the agency's prescribed goals. E.g.
CHESTER I. BERNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 215, 231-34, 251-57 (1968);
JAMES Q. WILSON, POLIT[CAL ORGANIZATIONS 9-10, 13 (1973); PHILLIP SELZNICK, TVA AND
GRASS RooTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS 12-13 (1949).
184. E.g. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973); Buckeye
Power Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub non. Tenn. Valley
Auth. v. EPA, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d I (3d Cir.
1973), vacated and remanded by 427 U.S. 902 (1976); Essex Chem. Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974);
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Anaconda Co.
v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir.
1973); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckclshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972]. affd, 467
F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); EDF v. EPA, 489 F.2d
1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975). cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976); Maryland v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 116 (D. Md. 1976).
185. Neuman, supra note 109, at 622.
186. Id. (citing Brief for Anaconda Co. at 38. Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F.
Supp. 697 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (No. C-4362)).
187. See 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
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Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, "I a case dealing with new
source performance standards.
In Portland,8 9 the plaintiff industries argued inter alia that
NEPA applied and that EPA should carry out a detailed cost-
benefit analysis that evaluated pollution reduction levels against
incremental increases in industry expenditure1 90 The court
decided that it was not necessary to decide the broad question of
NEPA's applicability to EPA on the ground that Section 111 of
the Clean Air Act constituted a narrow exemption from NEPA.'
g9
Judge Leventhal resolved that any determination of the "best
system of emission reduction" that took "into account the cost of
achieving such reduction" 192 constrained the Administrator to
consider counter-productive environmental effects as well as the
cost to industry. 193 Together with the need for a statement of
reasons, these factors constituted the "functional equivalent" of a
NEPA impact statement, and they exempted EPA from the
stricter requirements of NEPA.194 The fact that the time involved
in complying with NEPA, as interpreted by the courts, would
have prevented EPA from meeting the rigorous and inflexible
time schedules set out in the Clean Air Act was regarded as a
"substantial," if not a decisive, consideration. 195
A similar decision was reached in Essex Chemical Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, which was consolidated with Appalachian Power
Co. v. EPA.'9 6 The petitioner corporation maintained, inter alia,
that in promulgating standards for sulfuric acid, EPA failed to
consider the adverse impact on water caused by tail gas
scrubbers that would have to be installed if the new source
performance standards were to be met.1 97 The petitioner argued
that EPA should have complied with NEPA. EPA, while admitting
that the setting of standards might involve other environmental
impacts, cast NEPA in general terms, in contrast to the specific
provisions of the Clean Air Act. 9 ' EPA further argued that the
188. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
189. Id.
190. See Neuman, supra note 109, at 617 (citing Brief for Portland Cement Ass'n
as Petitioner at 35, Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.
1973)).
191. See 486 F.2d at 384.
192. Id. at 385.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 384.
195. Id. at 381.
196. 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
197. See 486 F.2d at 439.
198. See EPA Brief at 21. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.
1973] (No. 72-1079), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
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Clean Air Act was based on the premise that air pollution levels
were at crisis levels demanding strict time limits for
compliance. 99 The application of NEPA would be inconsistent
with the time constraints central to the Clean Air Act. The court
found no reason to divert or expand from the logic of the Portland
Cement decision, and it held that NEPA impact statements were
not a condition to making Section 111 determinations. °°
The Kalur v. Resor20 1 court went against the tide and held
that, in exercising its powers under the Refuse Act Permit
Program, the Army Corps of Engineers was fully subject to
NEPA. The Corps of Engineers could not delegate its statutory
authority under the Refuse Act to EPA.20 2 Congress responded by
exempting EPA from that responsibility. The Clean Water Act
exempts EPA from preparing impact statements to accompany
its actions, except when dealing with grants to municipalities for
waste treatment facilities and permits for discharges from new
sources. 3 Similarly, the Energy Supply and Environmental
Coordination Act of 1974 provided that no action taken by EPA
under the Clean Air Act would require an EIS.2°4 Furthermore,
EPA determined that regulations under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,205 the Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976,206 the Safe Drinking Water Act,2"7 and the
Noise Control Act2 "a are exempt from NEPA.
20 9
While policies and laws based on integrated perspectives did
exist, they were swamped by a confluence of policies and politics.
Those policies and politics, as we have seen, included
dissatisfaction with New Deal administration, incrementalism,
the competition for environmental credit between President
Nixon and Senators Muskie and Jackson, rivalry between
Congressional committees, and the preference of bureaucrats for
programmatic administration.
199. See id. at 15; see also Neuman. supra note 109, at 606.
200. See 486 F.2d at 43 1.
201. 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
202. See td. at 14-15.
203. Clean Water Act § 51 l(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1994).
204. Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 § 7(c)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (1994).
205. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act).
206. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
207. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300J-26 (1994) (Safe Drinking
Water Act).
208. Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1994).
209. 44 Fed. Reg. 64,174 (1979).
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F. The Present Predicament
Congress admits that a problem exists. The findings
embodied in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, now
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, acknowledge that the Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts have created problems of solid waste
disposal, that in turn have created problems of air and water
pollution.21 0 A clearer recognition of the nature of cross-media or
inter-media transfers led the British Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution to conclude that "most of the present
and future problems in environmental pollution will be of this
cross-media type."2 11 In a similar vein, the U.S. National
Research Council notes that "multimedia transport of pollution
appears to be the rule rather than the exception."2 12
The Pollution Prevention Act (PPA)2 13 is an important step in
the direction of an integrated approach to pollution control.
Congress concluded that there are significant new opportunities
for reducing or avoiding the billions of dollars the United States
spends on controlling pollution. Congress recognized that
opportunities for source reduction are often not realized because
existing regulations, and the industrial resources they require for
compliance, focus on treatment and disposal rather than on
source reduction. Accordingly, Congress embraced the need for
cost-effective changes in production, operation, and raw material
selection that would reduce or prevent pollution at the source.
The PPA realizes the need for multimedia management.2 14
The Act finds that "[slource reduction is fundamentally different
and more desirable than waste management and pollution
control" and that the "Environmental Protection Agency needs to
address the historical lack of attention to source reduction."2 15
The PPA further crystallizes some essentials of integrated
210. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(3) (1994] ("[Als a result of the
Clean Air Act 142 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.] the Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251 et seq.], and other Federal and State laws respecting public health and the
environment, greater amounts of solid waste (in the form of sludge and other
pollution treatment residues) have been created. Similarly, inadequate and
environmentally unsound practices for the disposal of solid waste have created
greater amounts of air and water pollution and other problems for the environment
and for health.... -).
211. ROYAL COMM'N ON ENVrL. POLLUTION, TACKLING POLLUTION- EXPERIENCES AND
PROSPECTS (Reps No. 10) (1984) (emphasis added).
212. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SYMPOSIUM; MULTIMEDIA APPROACHES TO POLLUTION
CONTROL 4 (1987).
213. Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (1994).
214. Id. § 13101(a)(3).
215. Id. § 13101(a)(4).
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environmental management (IEM) by declaring that the national
policy of the United States requires that pollution should be
prevented or reduced at the source whenever feasible.216 Under
the PPA, the Administrator of the EPA is charged with developing
and implementing a strategy promoting "source reduction." '217
The ex ante approach to pollution control embodied in PPA is
a far cry from the ex post laws and policies to which we have
become accustomed. While this change deserves acclaim, it is
wise to guard against false hope. Although the PPA, by shifting
the focus of pollution control from effects to sources, resonates
with prophetic cadences,"' the portents for a hortatory bang
fizzling into an implementing whimper are disappointingly high.
All that the PPA provides regarding institutional implementation
is a charge to the already harassed and overburdened
Administrator of EPA to develop and implement a strategy to
promote source reduction.219
This legislative prodding added to the mounting evidence
and conviction, at least within the leadership of EPA in both the
Bush and Clinton Administrations, that single medium
regulation is both ineffective and inefficient. Responding to these
pressures, the Clinton Administration unveiled Project XL (an
acronym for eXcellence and Leadership) in 1995. The project
consists of twenty-five initiatives intended to reinvent
environmental regulation.220 Many of these programs attempt to
216. Id. § 13101(b).
217. Id. § 13103(b). Source reduction is defined as "any practice which reduces
the amount of any hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant entering the
waste stream." Source reduction "includes equipment technology modifications,
process or procedure modifications, reformulation or redesign of products, and
substitution of raw materials." Id. § 13102(5)(A).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 13101(b).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 13103(b).
220. President William J. Clinton & Vice President Albert A. Gore, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation, Mar. 16, 1995, available at
http://www.epa.gov/reinvent/notebook/19950316.pdf. The XL initiative has been
extensively discussed. E.g., James Salzman, Beyond the Smokestack: Environmental
Protection in the Service Economy, 47 UCLA L. REv. 411 (1999): Robert M. Sussman.
The Government Performance and Results Act and the Future of EPA: A Second Look,
29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10347 (1999); Lawrence E. Susskind & Joshua Secunda, The Risks
and the Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA's Project XL, 17 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POLY 67 (1998-1999): Pamela Hill. Emerging Policy and Legal Directions
at EPA, 33 NEW ENG. L. REv. 625 (1999); Thomas E. Caballero, ProjectXL: Making It
Legal, Making It Work, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 399 (1998); Bradford C. Mank, The
Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives:
The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1998): Rena I. Steinzor.
Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-
Control, 22 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 103 (1998); Rena I. Steiznor, Regulatory Reinvention
and ProjectXL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENvTL. L. REP. 10527 (1996);
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adopt a multi-media approach to regulation, amounting in effect
to an integrated approach to pollution control. Unfortunately, no
direct legislative authority exists for adopting IPC. Despite the
fact that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)22' and the
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)222 provide EPA with
authority to move toward IPC, the EPA has not done so. The
courts have effectively exempted EPA from making an EIS
statement under NEPA.223 Moreover, EPA has chosen not to act
under TSCA.
224
This means that EPA must find its power and authority to
carry out the Clinton Administration's XL projects using existing
statutory mandates under the Clean Air Act (CAA),225 the Clean
Water Act,22 6 the Safe Drinking Water Act,2 2 1 the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),225 the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA),229 and the Toxic Substances Control Act. 230 While the
lack of a specific IPC statute may be seen by some as providing a
long-term ability to introduce IPC into the current system,23'
industry has been adamant that it needs legislative protections
to carry out XL projects in order to defend themselves from the
threat of citizen suits. Industry also feels that EPA and states
require a clear mandate to provide flexibility. While there have
been some efforts to draft legislation that could enjoy broad
Daniel J. Fiorino, Essay: Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The
Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENvrL. L. 457 (1996).
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(e) (1994).
222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
223. See Guruswamy, supra note 71, at 477-79, 484-87, 490-92.
224. See Robert V. Percival. Presentation at American Association of Law Schools
Annual Meeting, Joint Program of Sections on Environmental Law and Torts and
Compensation Systems, Three Perspectives on Risk: Common Law, Environmental
Regulation and Law and Economics, Jan. 6, 1997, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 513. 520
(1997); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (a) (1994); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201 (5th Cir. 1991); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 548 (1997)
(stating that, "In the six years that have passed since the Corrosion Proof Fittings
opinion, EPA has not initiated a single action under section 6 of TSCA, and it is not
likely to use section 6 to impose requirements that regulatees oppose until it is
amended to overrule the court's opinion.").
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
226. Federal Water Pollution ControlAct, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1994).
228. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
229. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
230. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
231. See Lisa C. Lund, Project XL: Good for the Environment, Good for Business,
Goodfor Communities, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10140 (2000).
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support,2 to date, Congress has not seriously considered any
such legislation. 3
Weaknesses in the vision of both the PPA and the XL
program compound infirmities in their implementation. For
instance, the PPA and Project XL institutionalized an operational
modality of integrated environmental management (JEM) that
concentrates on preventive technology, modifications of plant,
and industrial processes and procedure redesigns. However, an
operational version of IEM largely assumes the need for activities
and products that lead to pollution and seeks to neutralize the
deleterious effects of such activities and demands. Therefore,
operational IEM does not provide for a truly comprehensive
approach to pollution control and ecology that could radically
and strategically change the sources and demands that lead to
pollution.
While the operational versions of preventive IEM,
represented by PPA and Project XL, represent a significant step
forward, they are based on environmentalism rather than
ecologicalism and are unable to address the fundamental
restructuring demanded by the management of life support




A comprehensive ecological approach confronts a substantial
difficulty that needs to be addressed at the outset. If everything
is related to everything else in increasing degrees of complexity,
then nothing can be done unless everything is understood. An
integrated approach seeks to further such understanding by
synthesizing the myriad areas of knowledge about these
ecologically inter-connected issues. But as we have seen, fully
understanding the daunting biocomplexity of the physical,
biological, and chemical life support systems in order to
undertake SD is an intimidating, if not an impossible, task. An
integrated approach seems first to demand an almost
superhuman feat of comprehending all these earth support
232. See Baucus Soon to Introduce Bill to Set Up Pilot MultiMedia Programs, 17
CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 1709 (Jan. 7, 1994).
233. S. 1348, 105th Cong. (1997). There was a new effort in 1999 to build a
bipartisan consensus in both the House and Senate to legislate an "XL-like" program.
Second Generation of Environmental Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 3448, 106th
Cong. (1999).
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systems. This is followed by the need for legal and institutional
implementation, although the legal and administrative
structures required for such an endeavor are non-existent today.
The eminent economist/political scientist Charles Lindblom
articulated the significant deficiencies of an integrated approach;
he cogently argued that precisely because everything is
interconnected, environmental problems are beyond our capacity
to control in one unified policy.234 Lindblom asserted that the
very enormity of the interconnected environment makes it
impossible to treat as a whole. Tactically defensible or
strategically defensive points of intervention must be found,23
suggesting that a step-by-step approach will help to solve a
problem better than a grand solution based upon the necessarily
incomplete analysis offered by comprehensive rationality.
Lindblom also contended that a "rational-comprehensive"
decisionmaking process that adopts a synoptic perception of a
problem, collects all relevant information, and explores all
relevant solutions after considering all relevant answers, is
impossible to develop when dealing with the environment as a
whole. Such an approach, which is admirably marked by clarity
of objective, explicitness of evaluation, a high degree of
comprehensiveness of overview, and quantification of values for
mathematical analysis, is only possible when dealing with small-
scale problems with a very limited number of variables. Lindblom
suggested, that poor as it is, incremental politics ordinarily offers
the best chance of producing beneficial political changes.
To the extent that an integrated approach must take account
of political reality, it seems undeniable that most people simply
find it too overwhelming to think concurrenUy of whole litanies of
problems without succumbing to agitated confusion or passive
despair. Instead, building a series of "small wins" creates a sense
of control, reduces frustration and anxiety, and fosters continued
enthusiasm on the part of the public, scientists, and
politicians.236 These "small wins," however, can be real victories
only if they contribute to an overarching integrated strategy.
Industrial ecology may provide the bridge between
fragmentation and integration and allow for such "small wins."
At its core, industrial ecology focuses on the materials, energy,
234. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
79, 79-82 (1959).
235. See Charles E. Lindblom, Incrementalism and Environmentalism, in MANAGING
THE ENVIRONMENT 83 (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1973).
236. J. T. Heinen & R. S. Low, Human Behavioral Ecology and Environmental
Conservation, 19 ENVTL. CONSERVATION(2) 105-116 (1991).
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and product flows that characterize technological society. 237 To
the extent that a firm or industrial unit is the analog of a living
organism, many of the insights gained from the study of these
flows through the natural environment, and the lessons learned
from the applications of models to natural systems can help in
the development of good practice for systems models in
industry.238 At the same time, those engaged in the laudable
enterprise of collecting data and understanding the interactions
of various physical, chemical, and biological processes and
cycles that regulate the world could learn about the vicissitudes
of the political and legal processes encountered by industrial
ecology and IPC.
Industries and ecosystems are examples of self-organizing
systems that process materials into useful forms using external
sources of free energy. 9 The utility of IE lies in the fact that it is
a practical expression of the principles of ecology at the level of
industry that offers pragmatic criteria on how to better manage
large-scale ecosystems. Industrial activities may provide valuable
"bottom up" experience because of the compelling analogy
between biological processes and industrial metabolisms.
Lindblom notwithstanding, ecologicalism calls for the
adoption of a comprehensive approach to the entire planetary
ecosystem, and to its management. This is a gargantuan
scientific task. The need to better understand water, the
atmosphere, and biodiversity demands rigorous scientific
research not only into whole systems, but also into how the
details fit into the overall scheme.2 40 This involves not only large-
scale control experimentation on whole catchments and
ecosystems, but also the modeling of whole systems in order to
study the likely consequences of management actions.2 4 '
However, management relating to ecosystems
242 or risk,24 3
whether on a national or international level, is a largely political
activity in which the decisions taken may not be based on the
best scientific evidence. That is why it is important for at least
some scientists to be conscious of the political dimension to their
237. See Reid Lifset, Why Industrial Ecology?, 1 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 1 (1998).
238. See Mitchell J. Small, Show Me the Data, 1 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 9 (1998).
239. R. U. Ayres, Industrial Metabolisr, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 6, at 366.
240. See STEPHEN TRUDGILL, SOIL AND VEGETATION SYSTEMS 4 (2d ed. 1988).
241. See id. at 19.
242. See id.
243. See William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science and Democracy, in FOUNDATIONS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 48-52 (Richard L. Revesz ed., 1997).
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research, so that it might be presented in the most politically
palatable fashion, and in a manner that lends itself to legal and
administrative adoption.
CONCLUSION
Human and natural forces have created multiple interacting
changes influencing the physical, chemical, biological, political,
legal, and institutional life support systems at national, regional,
and global levels. These changes and impacts call for responses
that will continue to support and enrich life. In the first place,
there is a need to formulate, or re-conceptualize the objectives or
goals of environmental management. This is a dynamic, ongoing
process as distinct from an inflexible commitment to static and
predetermined outcomes, and it involves recognizing not only the
natural, but also the political life support systems of the world.
While recognizing the need for revised goals, this Article has not
embarked upon this undertaking, but has focused instead on
determining how these objectives can be realized. Ultimately, this
Article argues that the realization of environmental objectives
calls for an integrated approach.
A historiographical view of the United States' approach to
pollution control reveals a serious disjunction between "ought"
and "is." The need for an integrated approach based on our
understanding of the natural, physical, and chemical life support
systems stands in bleak contrast to the compartmentalized
response of policy, law, and administration based on political
and social realities. Such an experience can be disillusioning.
The deep psychological need for "small wins" and a sense of
accomplishment in the face of a daunting problem might be
provided by industrial ecology. The holistic approach to materials
and their flows that industrial ecology offers opens up a
promising segue into the difficult task of confronting the baffling
biocomplexity presented by climate change, biodiversity, and
resource management. Industrial ecology could become
symbiotically connected to the enterprise of understanding global
systems, and it could enrich as well as become enriched by the
larger undertakings addressing planetary life support systems in
the twenty-first century.
We are offered the opportunity to learn from our mistakes
and to respond politically, administratively, and legally in a
manner that reflects the undeniably integrated and complex
nature of the problems being addressed. The twenty-first century
beckons us to do so.
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